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Reviewing Directors’ Business Judgements: Views from the Field 
Professor Andrew Keay,* Professor Joan Loughrey,* Professor Terry McNulty,** Dr Francis 
Okanigbuan,+ Ms Abigail Stewart** 
 
Directors take decisions that can have significant impacts on others as illustrated by the global 
financial crisis and the collapse of Thomas Cook Group plc. Yet many academics argue that courts should 
not review or impose liability on directors for poor business judgments. These arguments often rely on 
untested empirical assumptions about directors’ behaviour and attitudes. Through semi-structured 
interviews and focus groups with directors, company secretaries, and others we explored their responses to 
the prospect of judicial review of directors’ business judgment. Our findings challenge orthodox thinking: 
many directors supported some form of review and the impact of review may not be as great as the literature 
predicts, nor necessarily detrimental. The debate about whether courts should review directors’ business 
judgment should therefore move away from reliance on negative empirical assumptions about the impact of 
review, to clearly articulating, and engaging with, normative positions that underpin opposition to, and 
support for, review. 
INTRODUCTION 
The global financial crisis and high profile corporate collapses, such as BHS Ltd and Carillion plc, 
resulted in much public criticism of directors. Directors have been required to explain themselves 
before parliamentary committees and rebuked by politicians and a hostile media.1  The policy 
response has been a renewed focus on corporate governance reform. In 2018, Grant Thornton stated 
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that ‘(t)he UK is witnessing a battle to restore trust in business….Governance is more in the 
spotlight than at any time since the “Maxwell years”’.2  However, importantly for this paper, in 
contrast to ‘the Maxwell years’, the conduct for which directors have been criticised is not, in 
general, fraud and siphoning off corporate assets, but business decisions that had disastrous 
outcomes, albeit in some instances allegedly as a result of greed, an overly short-termist 
perspective, and a disregard for the interests of a broader range of stakeholders than shareholders.3    
This led to demands for individual accountability of those in charge of companies that, whilst not 
always explicit, often seem directed to some form of legal accountability.4 Yet directors have faced 
little legal accountability in the civil courts for poor business judgments that underpin recent 
corporate collapses.5 The Government has often shied away from legislative measures directed at 
such accountability, asserting that the existing regime for enforcing directors’ duties ‘works’.6 This 
has resulted in a disjunction between on the one hand populist debate, which has focused on the 
lack of ex post sanctioning of public company directors, and, on the other, Government initiatives, 
which, outside the financial sector, has largely focused on soft law, disclosure, market discipline 
and, insofar as hard law sanctioning goes, measures that are most likely to target private company 
directors.7   
 
2  Grant Thornton, Corporate Governance Review 2018, 3. 
3  K. Burgess, ‘Carillion’s board: misguided or incompetent? The directors ticked all the good governance boxes, 
yet the contractor still collapsed’ Financial Times, 17 January 2018. 
4  For example Parliamentary  Commission on Banking Standards,  Changing Banking For Good, HL 27-I, (12 
June 2013), 10 
5  M. Moore, ‘Redressing Risk Oversight Failure in UK and US Listed Companies: Lessons from the RBS and 
Citigroup Litigation’ (2017) 18 European Business Organizations Rev. 733, at 736-737. 
6     Insolvency and Corporate Governance: Government Response (August 2018) 26.  
7  Small Business and Enterprise Reform Act 2015 Pt 9; Financial Reporting Council, The Wates Corporate 




 Some have argued that this is because debates over corporate governance reform in the 
wake of crises are often captured by elite corporate actors and their representatives. 8 Yet many 
academics agree that directors should not be exposed to the risk of greater liability for business 
decisions, often grounding their normative arguments on untested empirical assumptions about the 
behaviour, understandings and attitudes of those involved. For example, it is often argued that 
imposing liability upon directors for business judgments will deter able people from becoming 
directors, or will encourage defensive decision-making.9 Yet there have been no studies of 
directors’ responses to the prospect of review and liability and whether these accord with the 
predictions of the literature. This paper makes a novel contribution to this debate. Through a series 
of semi-structured qualitative interviews and focus groups it investigates the views of those most 
directly involved, namely directors, company secretaries and legal practitioners who have advised, 
or acted for or against directors. Whilst directors can be sanctioned for breaches of the criminal law, 
or for breaching their fiduciary duties, this paper focuses on attitudes to the prospect of judicial 
review of business judgments that could lead to civil or administrative liability, for example in 
shareholder derivative litigation, or litigation brought on the company’s behalf by liquidators, or in 
disqualification proceedings brought by the Insolvency Service.  
 Empirical research has ‘to test our basic assumptions about the world.’10  To this end we 
explored whether our interviewees’ worldview and experience supported the dominant view in the 
literature that favours directors’ business judgments not being reviewed in the courts. We found that 
 
8  M. Price et al , 'From Cadbury to Kay: Discourse, intertextuality and the evolution of UK Corporate 
Governance' (2018) 31 Accounting Auditing & Accountability J 1542; See also M. MacLean et al, Business Elites and 
Corporate Governance in France and the UK (2006) 47; C. Woll, 'Politics in the Interest of Capital: A Not-so-
Organized Combat' (2016) 44 Politics & Society 373.  
9   L. Johnson, ‘Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law : Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose’ (2013) 
38 Delaware J. of Corporate Law 405; A. Gurrea-Martinez, ‘Re-Examining the Law and Economics of the Business 
Judgment Rule’ (2018) 18 J. Corporate Law Studies 417, at 422. 
10  A. Dignam and P. Oh, ‘Disregarding the Salomon Principle: An Empirical Analysis, 1885-2014’ (2019) 39 




although interviewees shared reservations regarding the courts’ capacity to conduct review, most, 
though by no means all, nevertheless supported the idea of review. Our findings indicate that the 
empirical assumptions upon which many orthodox objections to review are based, are contestable 
and cast doubt on whether the impact of increased judicial scrutiny of directors' decisions would be 
as great as predicted. The study also challenge assumptions that this impact would necessarily be 
detrimental, because even when interviewees agreed on the effects of review, opinions diverged on 
whether these effects were positive or negative. These responses highlight that how one interprets 
and weighs empirical claims is not a value neutral exercise, but a normative one.  
 This article is organised as follows. It first examines the literature against review of, and the 
imposition of liability upon, directors for business judgments. The next section sets out the 
rationales for exploring the views of directors, company secretaries and legal practitioners, and the 
methodology adopted.  Following this, we present and analyse the data.  The paper concludes by 
considering how our findings can augment the debate about judicial review of business judgments.  
 
THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST JUDICIALLY REVIEWING DIRECTORS' BUSINESS 
JUDGMENTS 
 
The main academic arguments against review of directors’ business judgments by the courts can be 
broadly divided into two categories: (i) objections based on the role of the courts and (ii) objections 
based on the impact on directors and decision-making. These will be considered in turn, but they 
are only sketched due to space constraints. It should be noted that much of the literature discussed is 
American, as the majority of publications in this area are American. However arguments about 
whether directors' business judgment should be reviewed are generally equally applicable in both 
the US and the UK and, indeed, to other jurisdictions.  
 





(a) Court review lacks legitimacy 
 
An American court has said that the institutional competence of boards of directors should be 
trusted in preference to that of courts in relation to business decisions.11 Importantly, according to 
many, when directors make decisions they know that they might be removed or not re-elected, or 
they may encounter discipline from the markets, whereas judges are not usually subject to such 
consequences when pronouncing on matters that were before directors.12 Directors are in fact more 
accountable than judges. If directors make the wrong decisions they can be held accountable in 
multifarious ways, such as to the board, shareholders, the markets, and they could even have to give 
account to a court.13 In contrast judges are arguably not accountable to anyone. They are appointed 
until they attain a certain age. They can only be removed on very limited grounds. The only 
mechanism that might constitute one of accountability is that of appeal at which time a judge’s 
decision can be said to be wrong.  
 
(b) Jurisdiction to Review Excluded/Limited 
 
It has been argued that shareholders have agreed through the terms of the articles of 
association to delegate decision-making power to boards and so decisions of boards should only be 
 
11  W. Pont-Pepperell Inc v. J.P. Stevens & Co 542 A.2d 770 at 780 (Del Ch 1988). 
12  See, L. Johnson,’ Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule’ (2005) 60 Business Lawyer 439, at 457. 
D. Fischel, ‘The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case (1985) 40 Business Lawyer 1437, at 1443; M. Legg 
and D. Jordan, ‘The Australian Business Judgment Rule after ASIC v Rich: Balancing Directors’ Authority and 
Accountability’ (2014) Adelaide Law Rev. 417. 





subject to judicial review in limited cases, such as in self-dealing situations.14 Actual agreement by 
shareholders is impossible in large companies, but it is nevertheless argued that as rational beings 
shareholders would be willing to agree by contract ex ante to refrain from impugning the 
reasonableness of directors’ business judgments, and one should treat such a hypothetical 
agreement as binding.15 Although directors’ business judgments may lead to bad consequences for 
many reasons, shareholders knowingly take this risk when they appoint the directors.16 
Shareholders will actually want directors to take greater risks as these may well produce greater 
benefits. It is in the shareholders’ interests that the law does not incentivise a cautious approach to 
decision-making.17 Easterbrook and Fischel assert that the very thing that is behind the business 
judgment rule, a rule of law that protects directors’ judgments from review by the courts, is an 
acknowledgment that shareholder value would be lower if directors’ decisions were subjected to 
review.18 This accords with the often advocated notion that there should be limited judicial intrusion 
into private sector business decision-making.19 These arguments are normative in nature and treat 
companies as private institutions, disregarding any wider impact directors' decisions may have.  
 
(c) Judges lack experience and ability 
 
 
14  D. Telman, ‘The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure and Executive Compensation’ (2007) 81 Tulane Law 
Rev. 829 at 840, 850. 
15  Bainbridge, op.cit., n. 13, p. 115. 
16  B. Black, ‘The Principal Fiduciary Duties of Boards of Directors’ 4 April 2001, Third Asian Roundtable on 
Corporate Governance, Singapore at 6 < http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/1872746.pdf>  
17  Joy v. North 692 F. 2d 880 at 885 (1982). 
18  The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, (1991) 93. 




Many commentators argue that judges are not business experts and so not able to review directors’ 
decisions.20  Fischel for example states the frequently espoused line that: ‘Courts ... do not possess 
the experience, expertise, or information necessary to make complicated business decisions.21  It 
has also been suggested that judges do not have the expertise to assess business judgments as the 
quality of a judgment cannot always be evaluated on the basis of results, and that judges ‘lack an 
intangible “sense” of the specific circumstances confronting a business.’22 Directors’ decisions may 
lead to bad results for many reasons and it is likely that courts are not able to ascertain whether this 
was due to bad business judgments.23 According to Oesterle, judges lack business experience and 
‘clever lawyers and paid experts will ably add to the confusion.’24  Rosenberg has said that ‘the real 
problem with reviewing bad decisions by corporate directors…is that courts will sometimes get it 
wrong in determining how and why directors got it wrong.’25 
Bainbridge has maintained that judges suffer from information asymmetry, as courts might 
not be apprised of all the necessary information for making a decision, due to time and cost, which 
impedes them in making a fair decision about what directors did.26  In contrast Easterbrook and 
Fischel argue that with disclosure in the litigation brought against directors, judges have access to 
more information, and more time to consider the issue confronting directors, than directors will 
 
20  For example, B. Cheffins in Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (1997), 543; F. Treim, ‘Judicial 
Schizophrenia in Corporate Law : Confusing the Standard of Care with the Business Judgment Rule’ (2007) 24 Alaska 
Law Rev. 23 at 28.; D. Osterle, ‘Corporate Directors’ Personal Liability for ‘Insolvent Trading in Australia, ‘Reckless 
Trading’ in New Zealand and ‘Wrongful Trading’ in England : A Recipe for Timid Directors, Hamstrung Controlling 
Shareholders and Skittish Lenders’  Company Directors’ Liability for Insolvent Trading, ed. I. Ramsay (2000) 38. 
21  D. Fischel, ‘The Corporate Governance Movement’ (1982) 35 Vanderbilt Law Rev. 1259, at 1288. See also 
Bainbridge, op.cit., n. 13, p. 119;  E. Posner, ‘A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error’ 
(2000) 94 Northwestern University Law Rev. 749, at 758. 
22  Johnson, op.cit., n. 9, p. 456. 
23  Black, op.cit., n 16. 
24   Osterle, op.cit., n. 20, p. 38. 
25  D. Rosenberg, ‘Supplying the Adverbs : The Future of Corporate Risk-Taking and the Business Judgment 
Rule,’ 10 < https://www.baruch.cuny.edu/.../documents/BriloffPrizeFac08-DavidRosenberg.doc>. 




have had, and thus judges should not pronounce on what directors decided;27 the judges are in a 
much better position ex post. This presents the possibility of a no-win situation for judicial review. 
If judges have too little information they are not competent, but the same conclusion is drawn if we 
say that they have a lot of information. 
 Other commentators suggest problems with the disposition, rather than expertise or ability 
of judges. Bainbridge argues that judges will shirk, that is, decide cases with minimal effort, when 
encountering claims against directors, because of bounded rationality, the complexity of many 
cases, and hindsight, and they will embrace short-cuts.28 In litigation brought by liquidators when 
the company is insolvent, it has been contended that the judges’ sympathy will be with the trade 
creditors who have suffered losses and against the directors who oversaw the company’s demise.29  
The suggestion appears to be that the courts will hold directors liable as a matter of course because 
the judges have seen the unfortunate consequences of the directors’ judgment, which can be far-
reaching. 
 Whilst these appear to be empirically grounded objections to the courts’ capacity to review 
directors' decisions, they are contestable. For example as Fischel points out, the argument that 
judges are not qualified to evaluate business judgments does not address the fact that the same 
judges are regarded as being able to deal with other complex commercial disputes.30  
 
(d) Hindsight bias 
 
It has been widely stated that if judges review directors’ business judgments there is the danger that 
they will make decisions based on hindsight bias. ‘Hindsight bias’ is the tendency to ‘assign an 
 
27  Op cit., n. 18, p. 100. 
28  Bainbridge, op.cit., n. 13, p. 119. 
29  Osterle, op.cit., n. 20, p.38. Also, see H. Butler and L. Ribstein in ‘Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A 
Response to the Anti-Contractarians’ (1990) 65 Washington Law Rev. 1, at 56. 




erroneously high probability of occurrence to a probabilistic event simply because it ended up 
occurring.’31 Persons who know the outcome of a particular event can exaggerate the extent to 
which the outcome could have been foreseen.32 They ‘tend to assign an erroneously high probability 
of occurrence to a probabilistic event simply because it ended up occurring.’33Judges hear cases 
about directors’ business judgments well after those judgments were made and very often the 
unfortunate consequences of those judgments are adduced in evidence. This, it is argued, will have 
an effect on judges in that they may well regard such outcomes as foreseeable and thus able to be 
prevented.34  There are clear comments from several English cases that demonstrate that judges are 
alive to the fact that they must not use hindsight in coming to their decisions.35 For instance, in Re 
Sherborne Associates Ltd,  the judge expressed the view, frequently cited subsequently, that it is 
dangerous to assume that ‘what has in fact happened was always bound to happen and was 
apparent.’36  
 
(e) Directors and Decision-making 
 
 
31  Bainbridge, op.cit., n. 13, p. 114. Also, see H. Arkes and C. Shipani, ‘Medical Malpractice v the Business 
Judgement Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias’ (1994) 73 Oregon Law Rev. 587, at 588; W. Allen, J. Jacobs and L. 
Strine, ‘Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van 
Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem’ (2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Rev. 449, at 455. 
32  Arkes and Shipani, id. p.588. 
33  Bainbridge, op.cit., n. 13, p. 114 referring to C. Jolls et al, ‘A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics’ 
(1998) 50 Stanford Law Rev. 1471, at 1523. 
34  J. Mannolini ‘Creditors’ Interest in the Corporate Contract: A Case for the Reform of our Insolvent Trading 
Provisions’ (1996) 6 Australian  J. of Corporate Law 14, at 38; Cheffins, op.cit., n. 20, p. 543; Bainbridge, op.cit., n. 
13, p. 114; J. Farrar, ‘Corporate Governance, Business Judgment and the Professionalism of Directors’ (1993) 6 
Corporate and Business Law J. 1, at 22; Allen et al, op.cit., n. 31, p. 454. 
35  For example, see Ball v. Hughes [2017] EWHC 3228 (Ch), [85]-[86]; Wessely v. White [2018] EWHC 1499 
(Ch), [42]. 
36   [1995] B.C.C. 40, 54. See also  Lewison J. in Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Goldberg [2004] 1 
B.C.L.C. 597, 613 making the same point in relation to an assessment of a director’s conduct in an application under the 




(i) Impact on Directors 
 
It is often claimed that if judges review directors’ business judgments this will discourage people, 
especially good well-qualified people, from accepting directorships.37 There has been some 
anecdotal evidence to the effect that people are now more wary about becoming directors, because 
of concerns about potential risks of liability and this will be exacerbated if directors’ business 
judgments can be judicially reviewed.38  
 
Whilst these arguments are based on empirical claims, a related normative argument is that 
it is unfair to expose directors, particularly non-executive directors (NEDs), to significant liabilities 
arising from good faith decisions, given that there is great discrepancy between, on the one hand, 
the potential risk to directors' personal finances if they are found liable for a judgment, (assuming 
they are not protected by insurance), and, on the other, the reward they secure from remuneration.39 
It is also said to be unfair to hold NEDs to account for board decisions when the information they 
need to assess the decision may have been withheld from them by the executives upon whom they 
must rely.40 It is argued that Directors and Officers Insurance (D&O)41 would not necessarily 
neutralise these risks:  damages awards could exceed policy limits; 42 cover can be subject to 
 
37  Arkes and Shipani, op. cit., n. 31, p.624; D. Arsalidou, ‘Objectivity versus Flexibility in civil law jurisdictions 
and the possible introduction of the business judgment rule in English law’ (2003) 14 Company Lawyer 5, at 5. 
38  F. Gibb, ‘Directors chilled by the fear of financial liability’ The Times, 23 September 2003; R. Baldwin, ‘The 
New Punitive Regulation’ (2004) 57 Modern Law Review 351, at 362; K. Vijayraghavan et al, ‘More independent 
directors take the exit fearing legal scrutiny,’ Economic Times, 21 June 2019: 
<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/company/corporate-trends/more-independent-directors-take-the-exit-
fearing-legal-scrutiny/articleshow/69883746.cms?from=mdr>.  
39  Allen et al, op.cit., n. 31, p. 455. 
40  D. Kershaw, The Foundations of Anglo-American Corporate Fiduciary Law (2018) 55. 
41  V. Finch, Personal Accountability and Corporate Control: The Role of Directors' and Officers' Liability 
Insurance’ (1994) 57 Modern Law Review 880; J. Tarr, ‘Directors' and officers' insurance: recent critical issues in 
Australia and New Zealand’ (2016)  J. of Business Law 1.  




exclusions, for example where directors are also shareholders and are sued by their companies;43 
and insurance cannot protect against the effects of disqualification. In addition greater review of 
business judgments by the courts could lead to insurance becoming unavailable or too expensive. 44  
 
 
(ii) Impact on Decision-making 
 
Linked to the above is the argument that if directors perceive that judges can review their decisions 
they will feel as if the courts are looking over their shoulders and will be more cautious in taking 
risks.45 It will make them more concerned about protecting their own positions than taking on risk, 
and lead to directors failing to maximise wealth for the benefit of shareholders.46 They will be less 
inclined to embrace risks in pursuing aggressive strategies which are likely to foster economic 
growth and less willing to take their companies into new markets, develop new products or adopt 
rational business risks.47  
This tendency to risk aversion could be increased by the fact that directors of large private 
companies and public companies may not hold any shareholding, or relatively few shares, in their 
companies. As they will therefore obtain no direct, major benefit from engaging in certain kinds of 
 
43     R. Merkin, ‘Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and the Global Financial Crisis’ (2009) 118  J. of the British 
Insurance Law Association 2, at 10. 
44  Arkes and Shipani, op. cit., n.31, pp. 619-620. 
45  M. Eisenberg, ‘The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers’ (1989) 51 University of Pittsburgh Law 
Rev. 945, 964. 
46  B. Manning, ‘The Business Judgment Rule and the Director’s Duty of Attention: Time for Reality’ (1984) 39 
Business Lawyer 1477, 1491; H. Glasbeek, ‘More Direct Director Responsibility: Much Ado About…What?’ [1985] 
Can Bus. Law J. 416, at 421; Osterle op.cit., n. 20.  
47  M. McMurray, ‘Special Project Director and Officer Liability, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, 
the Duty of Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule’, (1987) 40 Vanderbilt Law Rev. 605, at 617; Telman, op.cit., n. 




risk, they are likely to be more cautious than shareholders about assuming these risk.48 Thus a 
judicial standard of review that too severely imposes liability on directors for unwise decisions may 
exacerbate a tendency toward ‘sub-optimal risk acceptance’ and deter socially desirable decisions 
that could produce greater profits.49  Some limited empirical research supports these fears, finding 
that judicial scrutiny in relation to business decisions smothers growth in those sectors with high-
growth opportunities.50 It has also been found that insurance may mitigate or eliminate these 
effects.51 
Judicial review might also increase costs and produce a less efficient use of company 
resources. If judges regularly review directors’ judgments, it is likely that directors will engage in 
more monitoring, such as greater record-keeping, so as to risk-minimise. This means that 
transaction costs will be higher which will reduce shareholder dividends. This is not favoured by 
many contractarians who take the view that higher transaction costs are likely to prevent resources 
being put to the most allocatively efficient use (the maximum productive use of resources).52   
 
EXPLORING THE VIEWS OF MARKET ACTORS: STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS 
In a series of semi-structured qualitative interviews and focus groups undertaken with directors, 
company secretaries and legal practitioners between August 2017 and November 2018, we   
explored interviewees’ views regarding whether courts should review directors’ business judgments 
and the potential impact on directors of review.  There were several rationales for this. First, as 
 
48  Johnson, op. cit. n. 9. 
49  Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996);  Allen et al, op.cit., n. 31, p. 455; A. 
Gurrea-Martinez, op. cit. n. 9, p. 421. 
50  Y. Grinstein and S. Rossi, ‘Good Monitoring, Bad Monitoring’ (2016) 20 Rev. of Finance 1719. 
51  J. Ho Hwang and B. Kim, Directors and Officers Liability Insurance and Firm Value’ (2018) 85 J. of Risk and 
Insurance 447. 
52  A. Keay, ‘‘Wrongful Trading and the Liability of Company Directors: A Theoretical Perspective’ (2005) 25 




discussed, a number of arguments against review are based upon assumptions about how review 
would impact on directors and directors’ decision-making. However no research has been 
conducted exploring what directors’ attitudes to review are, or what they report the impact of 
review has been or would be. If directors confirm the predictions in the literature this would tend to 
support arguments against review, but if they do not then these arguments are weakened. 
Understanding the normative views of market actors regarding judicial review of business 
judgment is important for other reasons. The views of directors, and their advisors can influence 
policy and laws governing business, including proposals concerning directors’ accountability for 
their decisions. The existence of such influence has long been assumed.53 It is visible in the extent 
to which Government responses to policy consultations accept the views of the business 
community,54  but it can be also less visible as illustrated by the remarks of this FTSE 100 
Company Secretary:  
 
… when we designed the 2006 Act …so that there was a possible right to bring a derivative 
action …there was a real worry that there would be a plethora of US attorneys coming over.  
So that was why the two-stage approach was put into the Companies Act to make sure that 
there were no frivolous claims being brought against directors…. We sat with officials and 
put all that in.  Now that maybe has worked too well. (FGCS4)55 
 
 
53     R. Brady, Business as a System of Power (1943); C. Lindblom, ‘The Market as Prison’ (1982) 44 J. of Politics 
324; P. Gourevitch and J. Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of Corporate 
Governance (2005). 
54   See for example Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Government Response: Corporate 
Governance Reform (August 2017) 53-62 and Corporate Governance and Insolvency: Government Response (August 
2018) 5-6 and generally. 
55  FG: focus group participant; CS: Company Secretary/General Counsel. 4: fourth focus group of company 





This interviewee was not publicly associated with the Company Law Review Steering Group whose 
work led to the Companies Act 2006, yet described having a material influence over codifying the 
derivative action that permits shareholders to bring actions on the company’s behalf against 
directors for breach of their duties which could have led to greater review of directors' decisions by 
the courts.  
 Whilst directors of unlisted public companies, private companies, and owner-managers are 
unlikely to have the same ability to influence public policy, their normative views count for other 
reasons.  They are more likely to face judicial scrutiny for poor decisions, often through 
disqualification for unfitness proceedings under section 6 of the Company Directors’ 
Disqualification Act 1986. Judicial practice in such cases could be influenced by assumptions about 
the business community’s position on the legitimacy and fairness of review. This is not to suggest 
that judges’ decision-making would be directly affected but rather, as Kershaw argues: 
 
  Judges cannot divorce components of their personality formed by strong societal and  
 political consensus from their judging practice. These components form their taken-for  
 granted expectations both of the directorial role and the accountability function of corporate 
 law and regulation.56 
 
These expectations are likely to be informed, at least partly, by the generally negative academic 
commentary regarding the impact and legitimacy of review, and so it is important to know whether 
these reflect the views of the business community. 
Participants were selected using purposive sampling, aiming for a mix of directors from 
large public UK FTSE listed companies,57 other public companies, and private companies, 
 
56  Kershaw,  op cit., n. 40, p. 58 





including owner-managed companies. 58 Interviewees included executive directors and NEDs, board 
chairs, directors who had experienced court challenges to their decisions, and people with 
experience of being directors in England and Wales and either Australia and/or the US, in order to 
explore directors’ responses to contrasting legal approaches to reviewing directors’ decisions. 
Unlike the UK, Australia and the US have a business judgment rule of law, which protects directors' 
judgments from review by the courts, but whilst in the US this has resulted in directors’ good faith 
business judgments being largely immune from court review, in Australia a pro-active corporate 
regulator has pursued actions against directors for negligence in a number of high profile cases.59  
We also spoke with company secretaries/in-house counsel and external legal advisors. These 
groups can influence policy-making in corporate governance and directors' response to the prospect 
of review. There was no discernible difference in response between these groups and directors to 
the prospect of judicial review and liability. Finally we explored the views of two board head 
hunters to ascertain whether they predicted, or had seen in the financial sector, any impact on board 
recruitment as a result of greater director accountability.  
Interviewees came from a wide variety of sectors and industries including the financial 
sector. The last was of particular interest since we hypothesised that financial sector reforms, such 
as the Senior Managers Regime (SMR), may have focused directors’ minds on the issue of personal 
liability, thus providing an insight into how directors respond to a real prospect of review and 
accountability for board decisions.60 A mix of approaches were utilized to reach interviewees: 
advertising through industry groups; letters and emails; and, as the study went on, personal 
recommendations. Contacts were also made through two meetings organised through a regional 
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professional network covering ten company secretaries in medium sized enterprises and a national 
professional network involving twenty four company secretaries of large FTSE 350 companies. 
We conducted 24 interviews with directors, four with legal practitioners and two each with 
company secretaries and head-hunters.61 There were five director focus groups that included chairs, 
and three involving seventeen company secretaries/general counsel. Six current FTSE 100, five 
current FTSE 250, and nine other public company directors took part, together with 23 private 
company directors. However, the directors interviewed held, or had previously held, positions in 
more than one type of company.  Of the 29 company secretary participants, 14 were based in FTSE 
100 companies. In total we reached 110 people. 
To gauge reactions to real cases, we developed case-studies based on: cases in which the 
courts have reviewed or declined to review business decisions;62 one based on Royal Bank of 
Scotland’s takeover of ABN-Amro; and one on Carillion Plc. Participants were not told what the 
case-studies related to nor what the outcome of the cases had been. These provided a focus for 
discussion and mitigated the risk of biased responses designed to show the interviewees in a good 
light. We also sought to mitigate social desirability bias by assuring anonymity.63  Case-studies 
were supplemented by semi-structured questions on the desirability and impact of review that were 
informed by the arguments in the literature canvassed above. This enabled us to observe and record 
the approaches participants took to judicial review, and the rationalisations they adopted.  
 NVivo, a qualitative data analysis computer software package, was used to support the 
organization and coding of the data. We combed transcripts identifying words, phrases, terms and 
descriptions used to describe judicial review and scrutiny, taking into account normative 
considerations as these emerged in discussion. Thereafter, data were coded to develop emerging 
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categories and themes around normative arguments. The second step of our analysis involved 
developing these emerging themes into three first order categories evidencing various normative 
arguments namely: (i) those supporting judicial deference to directors’ business judgment and so 
non-review of business judgment; (ii) those opposing liability in respect of directors’ business 
judgement; and (iii) those supporting judicial review and liability for business judgment.  
Moving iteratively between these and emerging patterns in our data, further conceptual 
themes began to develop into second order themes.64 In relation to the first order categories (i) and 
(ii), that concerned opposition to liability for and/or review of business judgments,  these second 
order themes related to the dangers of hindsight and judges’ lack of business experience, directors 
reluctance to take board positions, and risk averse business practices. These are discussed in turn in 
the next section. In relation to first order category (iii), which concerned arguments in support of 
judicial review and liability, second order themes reflected issues such as societal demands for 
accountability, deterring poor conduct, and promoting governance best practice. These matters 
feature throughout this article and inform our conclusions. Whilst our coding was informed by the 
literature, this approach enabled us to identify matters not covered in the literature, as well as to 




1. Legitimacy/Permissibility of Review 
 
The first thing to note is that most directors supported some form of review and some said that it is 
legitimate in principle, and indeed necessary, for the courts to review directors’ decisions.  As one 
director said, if it is assumed that a court cannot review a directors’ business judgment: ‘that is the 
 




get out of all get outs, isn’t it?’ (FGD-3). There was however a range of opinion regarding first,what 
would trigger review and second, when liability should be imposed.  
 Regarding the first, directors considered that judicial scrutiny was legitimate when decisions: 
led to the insolvency of the company; impacted on stakeholders other than shareholders, 
particularly creditors, and to a lesser extent, employees; had serious, particularly non-economic, 
impacts; or were seen to raise public interest implications, such as, for example, the decisions of 
bank directors’, because of the systemic risk that banks and financial institutions pose.   
 A number of directors felt that the quality and integrity of the decision-making process was 
more likely to be compromised in insolvency situations because of the pressures under which such 
decisions were made, and also when the interests of stakeholders conflicted with shareholders, 
because of that conflict, and that this justified such decisions being more closely scrutinised. As one 
director said: ‘those sorts of situations with other stakeholders involved …should trigger a review 
because in many cases that (longer term) thinking doesn’t get done’ (FGD2 (SME)).  There were 
lower levels of support for review when only shareholders were affected, echoing the contractarian 
position that shareholders assume the risk of poor decisions and are sufficiently protected by other 
governance and disciplinary mechanisms. One director explicitly said: ‘It’s someone else’s money 
isn’t it? If it’s just the shareholders they took their risk didn’t they? Whereas in the case of other 
stakeholders like pensions say- that wasn’t protected sufficiently’ (D18). 
 Directors were less clear about why they supported review when decisions had severe 
consequences such as physical injury and death, or (less commonly) resulted in very large economic 
losses, particularly to non-shareholders. Review was often simply described as ‘the right thing to 
do’ with one director describing it as ‘natural justice… a societal justice’ (FGD3). However 
directors were very conscious of public anger as a result of the financial crisis and major corporate 
collapses, and the subsequent lack of legal accountability, and this may have caused some-though 
by no means all- to perceive a need for review when decisions had a significant impact.  As one 




actions, you know ridiculous. …We should have a process here that is a proper judicial process’ 
(D11).  Another said ‘I think that when there are failures it is helpful for there to be from time to 
time somebody strung up for something’ (D8).  Several interviewees referred to the need for review 
arising from the fact that directors occupy very responsible roles and manage other people’s money. 
As one put it, it was appropriate for people who were well-rewarded and given ‘a big role’ to be 
held accountable (D21).  These statements find echoes in the academic literature on the need for 
accountability of boards in order to legitimise the discretionary power they wield.65 Importantly, 
though, directors did not think that accountability through review would, or should, necessarily lead 
to liability.  Rather ‘it might be reasonable for a judge to take a look’ but ‘it could be judged that 
people have tried their best’ and there would be no liability (D18). Others said that judicial review 
would give directors the opportunity to show they had done ‘the right thing’ and be exonerated.  
There were differing views regarding when liability should be imposed. Respondents 
initially focused on imposing liability for decisions that led to breaches of the criminal law, or 
health and safety regulation. There was also strong support for liability for decisions involving 
conflicts of interest and/or a failure to act in good faith in the interests of the company. However 
there was also support for liability for honest but ‘incompetent’ decisions: it was felt that directors 
should not be able to get away with 'cavalier' and ‘slack decisions’ or careless disregard for their 
responsibilities.  
 Yet views varied on what counted as cavalier behaviour that would warrant being penalized.  
Many directors did not support review of the substance of a decision and of whether the risk taken 
by directors was reasonable, but did consider that decisions could attract liability when there had 
been a failure in the decision-making process, such as a failure to seek advice, or to ensure that the 
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information required to make a particular decision was available, or when directors failed to think 
matters through. Interviewees who adopted this position tended not to distinguish between decisions 
that went wrong because of external market conditions and intervening events, over which directors 
had no control, and those that went wrong because of risks that directors knew, or ought to have 
known about, and nevertheless chose to run. This influenced their views that directors could not be 
fairly held responsible for the outcome of decisions provided they had been taken after an adequate 
decision-making process. The question of whether the degree of risk taken was reasonable or 
unreasonable was irrelevant. As D5(Int) said: ‘If you’ve done everything correctly, then the 
decision’s the right decision as far as I’m concerned.’  
 But other interviewees were happy for courts to undertake substantive review of whether the 
risk that directors took was reasonable. One director stated: ‘I have no problem with a regime which 
holds people accountable for decisions they make that are disastrous and they should have known 
that or could have ...reasonably known that at the time’ (D11). Others referred to review being 
permitted for irrational decisions or decisions involving excessive risk taking. Thus one described 
supporting liability for ‘undue business risks’, defining these as ‘something that seriously puts at 
risk the business, the employees and the shareholders or customers as well’ (D23).  Another said 
that: 
 
(I)t’s not good enough to say ‘oh well, you know we’ve made the best decision and we 
obviously didn’t intend it to be a bad outcome, but it just was.’ I think no, you have to 
do more than just have good intent. You’ve actually got to demonstrate that you have 
been thorough and you know what a reasonable person would expect when you’re 
making material decisions (D7(Int.)). 
 
 Those who supported substantive review were more likely to focus on the impact of 




decisions that rendered them immune from review, stated ‘I can’t see why there should be…they do 
make decisions all the time which affect the lives of a lot of people’ (D11).  Another similarly said: 
‘I don’t see why a judge shouldn’t take a look at a business decision….When there are absolutely 
huge decisions that are affecting vast numbers of people, and serious amounts of money, I think it’s 
quite reasonable to go to a court of law’ (D5 (Chair)). In contrast other directors who adopted a 
more limited position regarding when review should occur were more likely to focus on the impact 
of review and liability on directors alone.  
 
2. The Capacity of the Courts to Review  
 
 Three distinct concerns about the courts emerged that mirrored those articulated in the 
academic literature, namely: that judges a) lacked business knowledge; b) lacked business acumen 
and c) were unable to place themselves in the business context at the time that the decision was 
made.  
Only a small minority thought that judges lacked the business knowledge to enable them to 
assess business decisions. Others considered that 'they’re quite bright some of those guys and they 
understand business quite well.' (FGD5(Chairs)). Arguably this is the weakest objection to review, 
as judges in the Business and Property Courts and Commercial Courts of England and Wales 
frequently review decisions in complex areas in which they have no prior knowledge, including 
complex commercial disputes.66 
 More thought that judges did not have the ‘subjective mindset’ of business people making 
decisions- that they were not ‘business savvy’.  This was more to do with having the right 
disposition, rather than with knowledge. It is not entirely clear what exactly judges lacked in this 
respect, whether it is that they did not share the same approach to risk, or whether it referred to a 
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lack of skill based on experience, or lack of certain abilities. Since directors are not necessarily 
trained and may not necessarily have any particular skill, it seems more likely that this refers to a 
different type of disposition, probably to risk. This links into the idea explored elsewhere that a 
distinctive feature of directors (and their decisions) is that they are entrepreneurial risk-takers.67  
 The third reservation was that given the pressures and dynamics of business decision-making, 
it is very difficult for judges to put themselves in the position of a decision-making director. A 
director of a large company, who had lost a case involving review of their decision, commented that 
whilst the judge was extremely clever and could understand highly technical detail in a specialist 
area, he could not understand how decisions were made in complex organizations (D19). Another 
said: ‘if you were the judge, how can you or anybody actually define how it felt at that very time 
that the decision was made? It’s the environment that you are in at that time, which I don’t think 
any draft minute or transcript could ever actually define properly' (D24). Other directors referred to 
the large range of matters that directors have to deal with within a limited time. This worry is 
closely linked to concerns about hindsight that we explore next, because as a result of such 
pressures ‘a decision may have taken a minute and a half and you might spend a week analysing it 
in court' (FGD5(Chairs)). These responses may be shaped by self-serving normative positions 
regarding the desirability of judges reviewing directors’ decisions, particularly in the case of 
directors who had no experience of judicial proceedings. Directors could also have been influenced 
by their legal advisors and company secretaries, whose views in turn could reflect those in the 
literature. Nevertheless the responses drew out features of directors' decision-making that could 
render it challenging for courts to review.  
 Second, a very small number of directors who had lost court cases or had been subject to 
adverse regulatory investigations were hostile to any judicial review of business decisions, and 
dismissed the capacity of the courts to conduct such review. Their responses could be explained by 
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the psychology of accountability: experiments suggest that when people are held to account after an 
event, this can entrench their commitment to their previous course of action even if it is 
demonstrably incorrect.68 This does not necessarily mean their views should be dismissed but it 
suggests that directors are less likely to accept that judicial review is legitimate when they are held 





A significant number of interviewees expressed concerns about hindsight bias. It was the 
most voiced concern in relation to review. The difficulty with this objection is that hindsight is an 
element that is present in much of what judges do. In many different kinds of cases judges employ 
some element of hindsight. This raises the question as to whether there is something particular 
about business judgment that renders hindsight bias a particular risk, compared with that which 
arises in relation to other types of decision that courts may review.  
As to this, a number of directors and company secretaries emphasised the uncertain 
environment within which directors take decisions. This meant that, at the time of making a 
decision, directors might not have all the relevant facts or the time to consider them. Yet their 
decision would be analysed a substantial time later, at comparative leisure by courts which are 
likely to have all relevant facts. Furthermore, the adverse impact of business decisions often 
developed over time, incrementally and would be felt in the future, sometimes years later. As one 
director said:  
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Now a lot of things that happen in corporations actually take months or years to mature. 
And you can’t necessarily see, at a moment in time, all the connections. And then what 
happens is the weeds actually grow to become huge ugly things. Then everyone is 
saying, ‘Wasn’t that obvious? Didn’t you see that happening?’  (D4((Int.)) 
 
 However there does not appear to have been a strong view that hindsight should mean that 
judges must always defer to directors’ business judgments.  Some directors viewed hindsight as a 
problem if it was used to assess whether directors had taken an undue risk, but not in the context of 
judicial review of whether the process that led to a decision was appropriate, possibly because there 
was perceived to be less uncertainty regarding what constituted a proper decision-making process.   
 
4. Impact on decision-making 
 
Our data supports the arguments canvassed in the literature that review of directors’ decision-
making could lead to more risk averse decisions. Directors who had faced legal accountability for 
decisions reported being 'more cautious' as a result. One described being: 
 
more questioning ….any sort of financial information that is produced has to be on time and 
has to be questioned incredibly thoroughly.  So the whole sort of rigour and slightly less 
trusting approach to information…. I am going to ask many more questions about it, perhaps 
than I would have before. (D19) 
 
Another described how high profile cases brought against public company directors in Australia had 
caused Australian boards to become ‘more conservative’ and slower to make decisions. It was 
reported that the prospect of personal accountability in financial services as a result of the SMR 




or would, lead to boards seeking more legal, management consultant, and brokers’ advice. These 
effects were felt even though many directors have D&O insurance that would protect them from the 
financial consequences of liability for business judgments.69 
 However opinions were divided regarding whether these changes would be positive or 
negative. Some considered that review would lead to sub-optimal risk taking, but others thought it 
could lead to decisions that focused more carefully on, and were better informed about, risk. 
  Thus a director who was very strongly opposed to review worried that: 
 
 (C)ompanies and boards would get more risk averse.  There are more downsides 
(than upsides to a decision) so behaviour would skew, skew that way.  The process of value 
creation would be impacted because decisions would be made in a different way, they would 
take longer and less risk would be taken. (D8(Int.))  
 
 Yet he went on to say ‘it would probably force a much more granular assessment of 
downside risk and more forensic analysis of whether those risks are appropriately managed and 
rewarded in terms of return.’  Similarly many directors thought that increased attention to the 
disadvantages of a proposed initiative would improve decision-making. As one said: '(q)uite often 
when you find bad decisions that are questionable, part of the bad decision is the fact that ‘all we 
looked at was the potential upside, we didn’t even look at the potential downside’' (FGD3).  
 It seems likely that if boards seek more advice and focus more on the downside of 
proposals, they will decide not to take certain courses of action that they might previously have 
proceeded with. Whilst this could be viewed as creating greater risk averseness, an alternative 
interpretation is that boards' risk appetites could remain largely the same but, as a result of being 
better informed and scrutinising proposals more carefully, directors would be better placed to detect 
 




when decisions fell outside the parameters of that risk appetite. Certainly it seems desirable that 
boards should properly identify and consider the downsides of a proposal even if it leads to some 
proposals being abandoned.   
 Our data also raises the possibility that judicial review might not have a significant impact 
on levels of risk taking because: financial services directors already feel under intense regulatory 
pressure; other public company directors are keenly aware that their decisions could be scrutinised 
by shareholders, the media and social media, and ‘the court of public opinion'; and private company 
directors are alive to the potential for decisions to be scrutinised by liquidators and the courts 
should things go wrong. Several public company directors reported that, in response to these 
pressures, boards had already changed their decision-making practice to seek more information and 
challenge more. As one director with long experience of being an executive and a NED within the 
FTSE 100 said:  
 
far more attention is paid to the risk of decisions…I would say probably 15 years ago when 
you prepared board papers for non execs to review, the risk of the failure of the deal was a 
long way down the priority list. It was all about the strategic advantages …Nowadays the 
risk analysis, what if it goes wrong…..That part has definitely strengthened the process. 
(D10(Int.)).  
 
Others thought that over-confidence would lead directors to dismiss the possibility that they would 
make poor decisions, or that any effect on risk taking would be short-term because directors who 
acted in risk-averse ways and inhibited their company’s ability to compete, would be removed. 
Another interviewee argued that there would not be fewer decisions because ‘(d)oing nothing is not, 
in many instances, an option’(D11). Whilst taking action carries risk, failing to act carries a real risk 
of destroying the business. For this reason, ‘boards worry… about not making decisions and about 




 Risk aversion aside, there were concerns that fear of review would consume valuable 
amounts of directors’ time, and deflect them from dealing with important issues, all of which would 
add to company costs. The fact that financial services directors suggested that more of their time 
was spent on compliance than strategy, because of concern about regulatory liability, lends 
credence to these concerns.  This could be exacerbated if, as a result of courts being more willing to 
review decisions, people were encouraged to initiate more actions against directors: dealing with 
such proceedings would be hugely disruptive for the company and involve the expenditure of 
company time and money. Whilst these are serious concerns, they apply to other forms of corporate 
litigation, including securities litigation, and to other people and institutions facing litigation, and it 
is unclear why they should have particular force in the context of holding directors accountable for 
the reasonableness of their decisions.  
 The negative aspects of litigation also need to be weighed against potentially positive 
outcomes. Other directors and legal practitioners thought that greater judicial scrutiny could make 
directors more aware of their duties, that their interests and their company’s were not one and the 
same, encourage longer term thinking, and focus directors’ minds on the consequences of their 
decisions. Some directors advanced the possibility that poor decisions could be influenced by 
(unconscious) ulterior motives such as greed, reputation-building, ego, and the desire to look 
successful, and the prospect of review might temper these effects and lead to better decisions 
   
 
5. Impact on directors personally and professionally 
 
As the literature anticipates, some directors considered that greater scrutiny of directors’ decisions 
by the courts could deter individuals from taking up positions as directors. For many this was more 
a prediction than reporting from experience. Nevertheless a number of financial services directors 




personal accountability introduced by the SMR. An Australian director also indicated that he had 
moved from being a listed company director into the private sector in response to legal and 
regulatory scrutiny of public company directors.   
 
On the other hand, a financial services director commented:  
 
In banking I know there are a lot of ‘well no one wants to be on a board of a bank. They will 
never want to take a… role at that level’, but then they do. (D18).  
 
 Furthermore directors in our study who had experienced litigation in respect of their decisions 
had not ceased to be directors. One who worked with boards disputed that directors would be 
deterred because they ‘all believe it is never going to happen to them’ (D4(Int)). Meanwhile despite 
the presence of the business judgment rule in the US, a common law rule devised as a safety 
harbour for directors making business judgments,70 US directors reported that, one way or another, 
their business judgments were challenged and scrutinised through litigation. Yet they continued to 
be directors, which again suggests that the deterrent effect of review may be overstated. However 
these directors reported that even unmeritorious cases tended to be settled before trial, which 
reduced the prospects of being held personally liable for judgments, and so possibly the deterrent 
effect of litigation. This is common in Australia could also occur in the UK, should directors’ 
business judgments become more widely reviewed.71  D&O insurance against the financial 
consequences of liability for business judgments could also blunt any deterrent effects of review . A 
number of our interviewees emphasised the importance of D & O insurance in influencing 
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directors’ decisions to take up positions.  However, as a US director, pointed out, litigation against 
directors in the UK has a higher media profile and greater reputational consequences than litigation 
in the US where litigation was seen simply as a ‘cost of doing business’.  We found that UK 
directors were highly concerned about the impact on their reputations should things go wrong, and 
so litigation involving UK directors could have a greater deterrent effect than in the US, and one 
that D&O insurance would not remove.72  
Nevertheless the data more clearly indicated that, rather than abandoning the role of 
director, individuals were instead avoiding particular sectors or companies, namely financial 
services and public listed companies. The reason was not solely, and possibly not predominantly, 
concern over personal liability, but lack of job satisfaction. Thus in financial services an increased 
focus on compliance at board level as a result of increased regulation, and a reduced focus on 
strategy, and improving company performance had decreased job satisfaction and led to directors 
considering their positions. Job satisfaction was also the reason that individuals continued to act as 
directors despite discouraging media and political criticism of directors. As one said: 
 
They are not doing it because they are risk averse, (given media, political criticism and 
shareholder activism)…. They actually want to do it because they enjoy the stimulation of 
being in a company that does have decisions and a strategy to review and they feel they can 
help and contribute. (D10)  
 
Job satisfaction has not previously been recognised in the business judgment literature as 
important but it appears from our research to be very significant in influencing whether directors 
take up or retain positions. This omission raises the possibility that the literature has not correctly 
calibrated the deterrent effect of judicial review. High levels of job satisfaction could mitigate the 
 




deterrent effect resulting from the prospect of judicial scrutiny. Conversely decreased job 
satisfaction resulting from poorly designed regulation or other factors could exacerbate such an 
effect. Interestingly directors reported that their lawyers were more alarmed by the risks of being a 
director than the directors themselves, possibly because, research suggests, lawyers tend to 
exaggerate legal risks and are more risk averse than business people.73  
 Some interviewees considered that a deterrent effect could have positive consequences, by 
opening up places on boards to under-represented groups. As one director commented it could 
change ‘the type of voice around the table maybe’ (D8(Int.)). Headhunters supported this, 
describing how boards  ‘eighty percent of the time, ninety five percent of the time, (recruit) the 
usual suspects…   versus somebody who has got critical thinking skills’, despite the fact that ‘there 
are people out there looking for roles and not getting them’ (H1). However concerns were raised 
that this could lead to a detrimental lack of experience at board level. 
Several directors also propounded the view that judgments should be reviewed so as to deter 
incompetent people from becoming directors, with one NED supporting review on the basis that 
many directors are ill-prepared for the roles they take on.  A concern with professionalism emerged, 
with a number of interviewees considering that review would improve standards amongst directors 
as a whole. One NED said, ‘ if directors are never going to be held to account then they can do what 
they like, completely risk-free, then you will never improve probity and professionalism’ (D3). 
Another considered that review would improve the quality of directors to the benefit of society. 
Concern was expressed that if poor conduct is not reviewed this could reflect badly on directors as a 
group. Another director said, ‘We actually don’t want the irresponsible people out there because it’s 
not helping any of us’ (D23). Because of these concerns, several directors were keen to develop 
some of the trappings of a profession, namely agree minimum standards of education and behaviour 
in order to be a director and the policing of directors’ conduct. In the absence of a professional body 
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with the power to discipline and remove incompetent directors from circulation, they looked to the 
courts to discharge these functions.   
   
6. Fairness to Directors  
 
Several interviewees expressed concern about the fairness of reviewing directors’ decisions. Whilst 
it was not considered unfair to hold incompetent directors accountable, incompetence was a quality 
that other directors possessed. It was not a quality that attached to one-off poor decisions. This was 
a potentially self-interested response given that interviewees acknowledged that they themselves 
could make, or had made, poor decisions. As one said: ‘The problem is the courts never review the 
49 decisions out of 50 that you actually get right.  They’ll look at the one that was wrong.  So 
where’s the balance in that?’ (D12(Int.). Even when liability was not imposed, a legal practitioner 
who represented directors in relation to financial services regulation, and who was not opposed to 
liability for poor business decisions, nevertheless noted  the great stress and anxiety caused by 
regulatory investigations to people who were ‘honest and hard-working.’(LP3).  
The difficulty with these arguments is that they apply to anyone who is sued for negligence 
and directors are no more hardworking or altruistic than, for example, doctors who can certainly be 
sued, and often for one poor decision after making many right decisions. In addition psychological 
literature demonstrates that people assess fairness from a self-interested perspective,74  and in line 
with this we found that fairness-based objections to liability tended to focus on its impact on 
directors' interests and did not take into account the interests of those affected by directors' 
decisions.  
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The interviews did identify one potentially distinguishing factor relating to directors, namely 
the role of reputation. Many interviewees emphasised the value of reputation to directors. Some 
argued that directors were sufficiently sanctioned by the damage to their reputation caused by the 
consequences of a poor decision, such that further sanctioning through liability would be unfair.  If 
directors do pay a higher price than other groups when their reputation is damaged, this could 
provide a rationale for giving them greater protection from liability. However much depends on the 
purpose of liability. If it is retributive or deterrent, then further sanctioning directors for poor 
business judgment through legal liability may be both inefficient-because the fear of reputational 
loss from poor decisions is a sufficient deterrent-and unfair because legal liability in addition to 
such reputational loss is an excessive sanction. D&O insurance could address these concerns in 
part, by protecting directors from the financial consequences of liability but these arguments would 
still hold when review of business judgments led to directors being disqualified, or if litigation 
carries adverse reputational effects additional to those suffered as a result of the original poor 
decision. However reputational loss is not a sufficient remedy if the purpose of review is 
compensatory, and some directors may not have a reputation that they are worried about losing or 
may not experience any reputational damage absent court review and sanction. 
 The most common concern was that it was unfair to hold NEDs liable when things went 
wrong. A common refrain was that directors -particularly NEDS- were not paid very much for the 
role they undertook, and that the money did not compensate for exposure to increased risk of 
liability. A lawyer agreed that the consequences for directors of liability for their business decisions 
was disproportionate. Several interviewees argued that it would be unfair to hold NEDs to account 
for poor decisions because they need to rely on executives for information, and may not therefore 
have the full information necessary to properly assess a decision. This objection may not apply with 
the same force to decisions around process, such as what information to seek prior to making a 
decision, and what degree of questioning and challenge is appropriate. It also raises the possibility 




they should have all the necessary information to make the decision. There was indeed a strong 
feeling that NEDs should be treated differently to executive directors, though a number of 
interviewees were concerned about the impact this might have on collective responsibility and 




A number of findings from this study augment or challenge existing thinking regarding the 
desirability of the courts reviewing directors’ business judgments. A key finding is that, from a 
normative perspective, directors considered that the courts could, and should, review directors’ 
business judgments. Given that interviewees were keenly aware of public anger with directors, we 
surmise that they see judicial accountability as a means of addressing that anger, not because it 
would necessarily lead to the imposition of more liability on directors, but rather because it would 
signal that directors are not immune from accountability and also because it would permit directors 
to explain and justify what they do. 
Many thought that review should be confined to the process leading to the decision, rather 
than the substantive reasonableness of the decision. This is consistent with the approach taken to 
reviewing business judgment elsewhere, including in the US, where a decision will be immune 
from review if taken after a proper process, in good faith, and in the absence of conflict of interest.75 
However, others were comfortable with substantive review and most interviewees did not consider 
that review by the courts was unfair to directors.  
Both those who favoured limited review on process grounds alone, and those who argued 
that review was unfair to directors, tended to focus on the interests and perspective of directors 
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alone, disregarding the impact that directors’ decisions can have on others. They did not explain 
why directors should be treated differently from people whose decisions and actions are subject to 
judicial review, particularly in negligence actions.  
However interviewees did hint at some reasons for treating directors’ differently. For 
example, fewer directors supported review when only shareholders were impacted by decisions, 
which may reflect the fact that shareholders are seen as voluntarily taking the risk of negligent 
decisions when they invest in the company and appoint directors.76  Interviewees also referred to 
the pressure that directors are under when they take decisions, and to the reputational penalty that 
directors will have paid as a result of a poor decision. Yet whether directors can be distinguished 
from other groups on these grounds is debateable. For example the decision to invest in a company 
is a voluntary decision but so is the decision to hire a lawyer or agree to a medical procedure,77 so 
we cannot differentiate directors from other professionals on that basis. Again persons in other 
occupations must also make decisions under pressure, such as barristers in the middle of a hearing, 
and surgeons who sometimes have to respond to some reaction from the patient’s body when in the 
throes of operating on someone.78  
In any event views that focus on directors' interests alone cannot be conclusive regarding 
what is fair or legitimate in this context. Deciding what is fair involves balancing competing 
interests and deciding whose should prevail: in this case those of directors and those affected by 
their decisions.79  Our data suggests that taking account of other interests can shape what is 
perceived of as fair: notably, those interviewees who supported substantive review were more likely 
to attach importance to the impact of directors’ decisions on a wider group of stakeholders.   
 
76  See K. Davis, ‘Once More the Business Judgment Rule’ (2000) Wisconsin Law Rev. 573, at 574-575. 
77  Telman, op.cit., n. 14, p. 853. 
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The research also highlighted a number of gaps in the literature. More consideration needs 
to be given to the role of reputation in the context of judicial review of business judgment. Given 
that other professionals can also experience reputational hurt as well as liability from an adverse 
court judgment, one question is whether the value of reputation to directors is greater than these 
other groups, so as to provide a reason for giving directors greater protection from review. Another 
is whether legal liability for business judgments will have any reputational impact over and above 
that produced by poor decisions and if so, whether this is fair or efficient which, as suggested 
previously, will in turn be influenced by whether the purpose of liability is deterrence or 
compensation.80  
An important omission is the failure by the literature to factor into its analysis that many 
directors enjoy being directors and gain job satisfaction from their work. In addition directors may 
not conduct a rational risk-benefit analysis of the risks of remaining in post due to over-confidence 
in their own competence, and in any event are more likely to be willing to take this risk than others. 
The neglect of these factors in the literature has led to the conclusion that review of business 
judgment will lead to directors leaving companies in droves, but our data suggests that this is not 
the case.  Directors are likely to remain in post provided that they believe that they are competent 
and they continue to enjoy what they do. Thus the risk that directors will be deterred from taking up 
positions is likely to be overstated. 
One concern though is that if D&O insurance became unavailable or restricted as a result of 
more judicial review of directors’ judgments, this could deter people from taking up director roles. 
The US experienced a crisis in its D&O market in the 1980s caused in part by Smith v Van Gorkom, a 
 
80  On reputation and director liability generally see: E Rock, ‘Saints and Sinners Saints and Sinners: How Does 
Delaware Corporate Law Work?’ (1997)  44 UCLA Law Rev. 1009; D Skeel, ‘Shaming in Corporate Law’ (2001) 149 
University of Pennsylvania Law Rev. 1811 at 1832-35; R. Shapira, ‘A Reputational Theory of Corporate Law’ (2015) 






judgment that imposed personal liability on directors for business decisions.81  This is something that 
would need to be monitored. However there are structural factors in the UK that make it presently 
unlikely that litigation against UK directors will rise to similar levels as in the US or even Australia. For 
example, the UK has no general corporate regulator that could take actions against directors for poor 
business judgments, the courts are reluctant to grant leave to shareholders who bring derivative actions 
against directors and, unlike the US, do not entertain litigation during corporate takeovers.82  Furthermore 
despite increasing levels of litigation against directors in Australia, the impact on the D&O insurance market 
is contested.83   
Finally interviewees identified positive impacts that could result from some people being 
deterred from being directors, such as more diversity in the pool of directors as a result of positions 
becoming available, and incompetent directors being deterred from taking up roles.  Similarly 
whilst our data supports claims that review of business judgements could lead to more cautious 
decision-making, opinion was divided as to whether this was desirable or not. In contrast whilst the 
academic literature speaks broadly and loudly on the cost that review would precipitate, there is 
little or no consideration of possible benefits. The presumption appears to be that a review of 
business judgments could only be a negative thing for directors, and probably for their companies 
and shareholders. The literature does not engage in any cost-benefit analysis, something that is 
advocated frequently when considering any issue.84 Yet our findings indicate that directors see 
positive elements in reviews by judges of directors’ decisions both from a normative and an 
empirical perspective. This is an important contribution to the field that calls for those engaging in a 
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theoretical analysis of review to re-consider the traditional line of thinking. The literature opposing 
review currently relies heavily on empirical predictions about the adverse impact of review that our 
research suggests is overstated. One explanation for this is that normative positions regarding the 
legitimacy and fairness of review have influenced the weight attached to empirical claims about 
impact of review. To avoid this, and to take forward and develop the debate in this field, future 
research must engage in a more transparent discussion about the normative underpinnings of 
arguments for and against review by the courts of directors' business judgments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
